
Cyber security: Firms need to consider risks
A law firm fined £60,000 [1] for a significant data breach has failed in its appeal against the penalty, with a tribunal saying the deterrent element of the figure was justified.
The fact that DPP Law had corrected the failings in its systems “does not reflect the risk that other law firms may be relying heavily on external suppliers for security”, it said.
To be effective, the penalty needs to be “sufficient to incentivise those firms, as well as DPP, to consider and assess the risks of such arrangements”.
The cyber-attack in early June 2022 saw highly sensitive details of 682 clients published on the dark web, but DPP Law only became aware of this when it was contacted by the National Crime Agency. It did not notify what is now called the Information Commission (IC) until 43 days after the attack.
The firm, which has five offices in Merseyside, Birmingham and London, specialises in criminal and family law, fraud, military law, actions against the police and sexual offences.
It processed highly sensitive personal data, including “special category data” such as that relating to somebody’s sex life, DNA and allegations of criminal offences, including child sexual abuse.
The attack targeted an administrator account for a legacy case management system which was taken out of service in 2019 but was still operational because of DPP’s data retention policy of six years. The account had been set up in 2001 and had unrestricted access across the network, but DPP did not know the password and could not reset it.
DPP appealed both the amount and the calculation of the fine but the general regulatory chamber of the First-tier Tribunal found [2] that the IC had correctly applied the five-step approach to calculating a penalty.
In assessing the seriousness of the breach, the tribunal said DPP failed to implement measures appropriate to the risks presented by its processing of highly sensitive personal data.
A key area of dispute was whether the late notification was negligent or, as DPP suggested, merely misjudgement. The test for negligence here comes from European law via the UK GDPR.
The tribunal said: “We find that DPP failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect the personal data it processed.
“In particular, it failed to maintain effective arrangements for reviewing administrative accounts, limiting their privileges and assessing whether their continued operation remained necessary and secure.”
It was “reasonably foreseeable” that the account posed risks to DPP’s clients’ data in the event of a breach. “We also consider that DPP could not have been unaware of its obligation to report the breach promptly to the IC under article 33(1) [of GDPR]. For these reasons we also consider that DPP’s infringements were negligent.”
The nature of the data the law firm processed was a “highly relevant factor” when assessing seriousness.
“The fact that DPP was a small firm with limited in-house IT capability did not lessen the seriousness of the omission to reassess security. Nor is it sufficient, in our view, to argue that with the benefit of hindsight most of the stolen material was published in an encrypted form.
“We do not consider that DPP’s reliance on specialist suppliers excuses the lack of understanding of potential risks or appropriate assessment of them.”
Notification to the IC was required unless the personal data breach was unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of the affected people. Here, there was “no reasonable basis for concluding that notification was not necessary”.
The penalty based on turnover was £23,800 but the IC bumped it up to act as a deterrent.
The tribunal agreed with this: “DPP’s failures were not confined to an isolated technical oversight. They included, inter alia, prolonged deficiencies in the management of a privileged account, inadequate organisational oversight of security risks, and material weaknesses in its capacity to understand and respond to the consequences of a serious security incident.
“Those failures occurred in the context of processing particularly sensitive personal data, and the Incident resulted in actual exfiltration, and evidence of distress to affected individuals.
“In our judgment, a meaningful financial penalty was required not only to sanction DPP’s conduct, but also to deter other controllers processing similarly sensitive information from failing to maintain appropriate technical and organisational security measures.
“We consider that those circumstances justified a substantial increase above the initial calculation.”
- There is a session entitled Keeping your data secure – and what happens if things go wrong at our Regulation & Compliance Conference [3] on 3 December in London.