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Court allows successful LiPs to recover cost of AI legal research tool

Sweeting: Normal principles apply

A High Court judge has allowed successful litigants in person (LiPs) to recover the £1,488 cost of a subscription to an AI legal research tool.

Mr Justice Sweeting said [1] it made “a real contribution to the proper presentation” of their case.

But he stressed that this did not mean such subscriptions would automatically be recoverable in similar cases.

He was ruling after the LiPs – pensioners in their 70s unable to afford legal advice – successfully appealed a suspended possession order obtained by Wargrave on Thames Housing Association after a circuit judge found them in breach of the tenancy agreement.

The parties agreed that the possession order could not stand and that the appellants were entitled to costs.

In the consequentials ruling, one element in dispute was whether the couple could recover the £1,488 spent on a subscription to the unnamed legal research tool. There was no direct authority on the recoverability of such expenditure by a LiP.

Sweeting J rejected the argument that the subscription was a payment for legal services within CPR 46.5, which deals with costs payable to LiPs.

“Rather, it was expenditure incurred by the appellants in carrying out their own legal work. That leaves the question of whether it can be regarded as a recoverable disbursement rather than part of inherent cost of conducting litigation.”

The housing association contended that the expenditure constituted overheads and that permitting recovery would represent “an unwarranted extension of the categories of recoverable litigation expense and could have wider implications for costs recovery in cases involving litigants in person”.

Sweeting J held that the AI element did not create a new category of disbursement; it had to meet the usual test of whether it should properly be characterised as a disbursement and if so whether the expenditure was reasonably and proportionately incurred for the purpose of conducting the litigation.

This was the approach taken over other technological developments, such as electronic disclosure platforms and document management systems, he noted.

This was a fact-specific matter but “in general terms however it would be an odd outcome if legal professionals could deploy their standing artificial intelligence resources in support of litigation but litigants in person were, in effect, precluded from using similar tools”, he said.

“That would do nothing to encourage equality of arms and might deprive the court of the assistance to be gained from the responsible use of artificial intelligence.”

The appeal raised a point of contractual construction – the issues were “primarily legal rather than factual and their resolution had potentially serious consequences” for the appellants.

“The material before me demonstrates that the subscription was used as a research and litigation support tool in connection with the preparation of their arguments and the identification of relevant authorities.

“They did not use a general or free LLM. They purchased a subscription which gave access to a sector specific artificial intelligence agent. The written and oral submissions advanced by the appellants were careful, reasonably focused and ultimately successful on the principal issue before the court.

“I am satisfied that the subscription claimed made a real contribution to the proper presentation of the appellants’ case.”

Sweeting J also took account of the fact that the couple incurred the expense specifically for the purposes of the litigation and funded it through borrowing from a relative.

“Standing back and considering the matter in the round, I am satisfied that the sum claimed was reasonably incurred and proportionate. I therefore allow this item in the sum claimed of £1,488.

“In doing so I do not hold that the cost of AI-assisted support is automatically recoverable. The recoverability of such expenditure will depend upon the circumstances of the individual case, including the nature of the service provided, the purpose for which it was incurred, whether it was reasonable and proportionate and its proper characterisation under established costs principles.

“The technology may be new, but the principles governing recoverability are not.”